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A MODEL FOR PREJUDICED LEARNING IN NOISY
ENVIRONMENTS
ANDREAS U. SCHMIDT
ABSTRACT. Based on the heuristics that maintaining presumptions can be
beneficial in uncertain environments, we propose a set of basic requirements
for learning systems to incorporate the concept of prejudice. The simplest,
memoryless model of a deterministic learning rule obeying the axioms is con-
structed, and shown to be equivalent to the logistic map. The system’s perfor-
mance is analysed in an environment in which it is subject to external ran-
domness, weighing learning defectiveness against stability gained. The cor-
responding random dynamical system with inhomogeneous, additive noise is
studied, and shown to exhibit the phenomena of noise induced stability and
stochastic bifurcations. The overall results allow for the interpretation that
prejudice in uncertain environments can entail a considerable portion of stub-
bornness as a secondary phenomenon.
1. INTRODUCTION
As almost all terms denoting affects, the term ‘prejudice’ is as ubiquitous as
ill-defined, and resists naïve attempts to provide it with meaning in any more
epistemologically rigorous sense. Yet the last century saw, with the advent of
game theory as a means of formalisation and modelling, the paving of a scien-
tific access path to such notions, partially as a side effect of the growing interest
in the behaviour of intelligent beings (usually called agents) in social environ-
ments [1], which in turn was spurred by the mathematisation of economics.
With the emergence of the Internet as a mass medium, this kind of research
has obtained a new test bed, a source of statistical data, and an independent
study object, and has thus gained further impetus [2, 3, 4]. Consequently, hard
science is lead to occupy itself with formerly foreign concepts from the psycho-
logical and sociological domains. Recent efforts in this direction combine game
theory and logic with nonlinear systems theory and stochastics, and some of
them are quite bold, as for instance [5]. The present study parallels these lines
of thought, and is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one to focus on the
concept of prejudice. It is based on the report [6], but is essentially enlarged
and refined.
Section 2 provides the theoretical framework on which the subsequent con-
struction of a model for prejudice rests. We set up a simple, general model for
an environment in which an agent needs to learn a fluctuating risk, and argue
that prejudice might be beneficial in such circumstances.
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The special instance of a prejudiced learning rule we consider is constructed
in Section 3. In particular, we define what we mean by a prejudiced determin-
istic learning rule, in the language of reinforcement learning. We then set out
three axioms we regard as heuristically sound for prejudiced learning in en-
vironments polluted with noise. We then look for the most simple prejudiced
learning rule fulfilling them, a rule which in particular does not require the
agents to have memory. In the noiseless case, the ensuing rule turns out to be
equivalent to the logistic map. In correspondence to the well known dynamical
features of this map we classify the general behaviour of prejudiced learners,
and obtain restrictions on their internal parameters. When the input to the
prejudiced learning rule is subject to random fluctuations, it still retains the
form of the logistic map, but with additively coupled, inhomogeneous noise.
To corroborate the argument that the limitation of rationality presented by
prejudiced learning can be beneficial in certain circumstances, a numerical
analysis of the performance of a subclass of prejudiced learners in an uncer-
tain environment is carried out in Section 4, for various levels of noise. The
result is twofold. On the one hand, the prejudice causes the agents to make
a small error in their belief about the true risk, generally overestimating it.
On the other hand, prejudiced learning can efficiently stabilise an agent’s be-
haviour, in particular for higher values of the logistic map’s single dynamical
parameter. Therefore, if both factors are taken into account, prejudiced learn-
ing has the potential to be advantageous in noisy environments.
Our special prejudiced learning rule with noise is an example for a noisy
dynamical system, a class of systems which has attracted a lot of interest from
physicists and mathematicians in recent years. Reference [7] is one earlier,
seminal work. Noisy, or random dynamical systems show a host of additional
phenomenology over ordinary ones, including phenomena that are to be ex-
pected from natural systems. Furthermore, they present a combination of
nonlinearity and stochastics on which now a whole branch of mathematics
thrives, see [8] and its vast bibliography. The system defined by the prejudiced
learning rule is therefore interesting in its own right, and we devote Section 5
to its study. In it, we rediscover the phenomenon of stochastic resonance or
noise induced stability [9, 10], for a large range of parameter values and noise
levels, as well as the phenomenon of stochastic bifurcations or noise induced
transitions [11, 12] as these parameters vary. Both phenomena have been em-
pirically confirmed in a vast variety of natural systems and models thereof,
ranging from biophysics [13] and chemistry [14], over financial markets [15]
and signal processing [16], to quantum information theory [17], without any
claim to completeness. We determine the stability domain of our prejudiced
learning system analytically using the Lyapunov exponent, and study the bi-
furcating transition from that domain, which is evoked by lowering the noise
level, using numerics. In particular, we determine the critical exponent of this
transition, in analogy to concepts of statistical mechanics.
Finally, Section 6 contains a comprising assessment of our model for preju-
diced learning. It concludes with some suggestions for further research to be
based on this and similar models.
2. BACKGROUND AND HEURISTICS
To place our work into theoretical context and delineate its scope we briefly
recapitulate some background. The framework for the construction of our
model for prejudiced learning is that of basic game theory and reinforcement
learning [18, 19]. We briefly sketch the necessary background.
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The classical, game-theoretical subject of decisionmaking under uncertainty
considers single- or multi player games of intelligent agents against an envi-
ronment (nature). Each agent has an utility function depending on the action
he takes and the (unknown) state of nature. This function describes the payoff
of the execution of the corresponding action given that nature is in the cor-
responding state. The utility function is taken to be the input for the agent’s
decision rulewhich uniquely determines the action to be taken. In the more re-
alistic case when a probability distribution over the states of nature is known
to the agent, one is in the realm of statistical decision theory. There, this knowl-
edge is fed into a selection scheme which determines one from a set of decision
rules accordingly. For example, the well known Bayesian decision rule is the
combination of a selection scheme and a decision rule which assigns to each
action the average sum of utilities weighted with the known probability dis-
tribution, and then chooses the action maximising this value. The knowledge
can be a priori or learnt by experimentation using some statistical learning
rule, which can be as simple as taking means over a finite set of experimental
outcomes (Bayesian learning). When the result of taking a specific action is
fed back as the outcome of an experiment into the learning rule and the whole
cycle is repeated many times, the agent becomes a learning automaton. This
is the basic object we consider.
The Bayesian rule is obviously not the only possible, there is a multitude of
different learning rules and selection schemes. Numerous statistical learning
rules have been considered in pursuit of the optimal one in a given environ-
ment, see, e.g., [20, 21], and references therein. In realistic cases it can be sen-
sible to choose selection schemes which differ significantly from the apparently
most rational Bayesian rule. Here, we propose a model which can justifiably be
said to represent agents who are prejudiced by construction and in behaviour.
We derive the heuristics for our construction from a key example:
Example. At each time step, the agent takes an action, selected from a finite
set A, with a certain payoff whose maximal value we normalise to 1, for sim-
plicity. Choosing action k, there is a — generically small — probability pk for
the occurrence of a damage dk which diminishes the maximal payoff to 1− dk.
Assume that the actual damage is symmetrically distributed with small vari-
ance around the mean value dk ∈ [0, 1]. The expected payoff then is the (true
empirical)weightwk ≡ 1−rk ≡ 1−dk ·pk of action k and rk is its true risk. The
weights are the quantities rational decision makers would base their decisions
on. Approximations for them are learnt by the agents from the frequency and
amount of previous damages they actually incurred. These are fed into a se-
lection scheme which in turn determines the decision rule for action selection.
The general feature of this example rendering the application of Bayes’ rule
less attractive is that the damage rate 1/pk and therefore the learning speed
of any statistical inference rule for the set {rk} can be very low compared to
the frequency with which an action has to be taken. Thus, initial probabilistic
fluctuations could result in the (costly) selection of a non-optimal action for
many steps. On the other hand, the expected damage dk can be close to 1,
resulting in relatively high risk. Thus, the agent has high interest in using a
reliable a priori risk estimate, to keep it stable against fluctuations, and still
learn as quickly as possible.
Numerous studies in algorithmic learning theory are concerned with opti-
mal learning performance in adverse environments polluted with noise, see [22]
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FIGURE 1. Prejudiced learning in the context of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. Shaded rectangles are internal states
of the agent, unshaded ones stand for actual events. Framed
rectangles are algorithms.
and references therein. There, the strategies of the learner, and of its ad-
versaries creating the noise, are rather elaborate. Our present approach dif-
fers from these by focusing on constructive simplicity of the model and its be-
havioural features rather than optimality. Furthermore, our adversary will be
a single, very simple, noise model.
3. MODEL BUILDING
Given these conflicting goals above, it can be sensible to use what we would
like to call prejudiced learning system for weights wk, by which we mean
the following. The agent is given a start value wk(0) for its belief about the
value of wk. At time t it infers its (empirical) knowledge ηk(t) from the t+1 ob-
servations made up to this time using some statistical learning rule not further
specified, with the single requirement that ηk(t) asymptotically approaches the
real value wk as t → ∞. The agents then updates its belief wk about wk at
time t+ 1 by prejudiced learning rule
wk(t+ 1) = L
(
(wk(s))s≤t, ηk(t)
)
, t = 0, 1, . . .
The essence of this constructive definition of prejudice is the heuristically
sound distinction between knowledge and belief, close in spirit to [23].
Figure 1 shows a schematic view of the internal structure of the prejudiced
agent and places it into the general context of decision making under uncer-
tainty. The scope of our model below is merely the transition from knowledge
to belief through a learning rule of the above kind, i.e., the three components in
the lower right quadrant of the diagram. We will assume in particular that the
reaction consists merely in informing the agent of its error, i.e., the numerical
difference between its belief and the actual state of the world. Furthermore,
since we consider the parameters wk to be independent from and wk to be un-
related to each other, we focus on learning of a single exterior parameter, and
thus drop the index k from now on.
Before proceeding, a caveat might be in order with respect to the terminol-
ogy we introduced. The Webster’s dictionary definition of the term “prejudice”
is a “preconceived opinion, usually unfavourable; the holding of such an opin-
ion; an unjustified and unreasonable bias”. But then, “prejudiced learning”
seems self-contradictory from the outset, and is certainly a controversial ex-
pression. We nevertheless stick to this slight provocation, though the bare
learning rule above and the three axioms set out below would seem to only jus-
tify more cautious terms like “prudence”. We shall see that at least one very
simple model for “prejudiced learning” will show characteristics, like staying
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away from the true value of the parameter to be learnt, usually attributed to
prejudice proper.
3.1. Axioms. The construction of the special model of a prejudiced learning
rule we propose is based on three basic axioms and guided by the principle of
simplicity. The latter means in particular that we consider only memoryless
prejudiced learning, i.e., L = L(w(t), η(t)). Furthermore, we seek to render L
in the simplest (functional) form possible. The axioms for the model are de-
rived from the heuristic meaning of three special cases of learning situations,
cases which can be viewed as constituting ancillary conditions under which a
prejudiced rule has to function. In particular, b) and c) are meant to justify the
attribution “learning rule”, while a) exhibits an extreme case of “prejudice”:
a) Inability is preserved: The valuew(0) = 0 is taken to express the initial
inability of the agent to perform the action. This must remain constant, i.e.,
w(0) = 0 implies L(0, η(t)) = 0.
b) Importance spurs learning: The higher an agents ranks an action,
i.e., the higher w(t), the faster it shall adapt its belief to its knowledge. That
is, |L(w(t), η(t)) − w(t)| is monotonously increasing in w(t) for all η(t).
c) Truth is preserved: If the agent’s belief equals its knowledge, then it is
kept constant, i.e., L(η(t), η(t)) = η(t).
These axioms imply a fundamental asymmetry between high and low risk,
which will reemerge in the behavioural patterns of any model fulfilling them,
as will be seen in the particular case below. Heuristically, the axioms incorpo-
rate a certain cautiousness, in that they tend to preserve a belief of high risk
(low weight). Regarding axiom a), note that we formulated it in the least re-
strictive way, since it does not exclude a value w(t) = 0 at later times. The first
axiom also entails a straightforward, implicit assumption on the decision rule,
namely that actions with weight zero are not taken.
3.2. Noiseless Case: The Logistic Learning Map. The combination of the
axioms with the definition of prejudiced learning is certainly satisfied by nu-
merous functional forms of learning rules. We now concentrate on a single spe-
cial model which, because of its simplicity allows to derive some phenomeno-
logical consequenceswhich seem to be of general importance and might pertain
also to more complex variants of prejudiced learning rules. It should however
be noted that any conclusion drawn from this special model holds properly
speaking only for this model and not for general prejudiced learning rules,
even if they satisfy the axioms above.
For the construction of a prejudiced learning rule satisfying the above ax-
ioms, we specialise to the noiseless case, i.e., we assume the input η(t) = w =
1− r to be identical to the true weight for all times. Expressed in the believed
risk r(t) and its error ∆(t)
def
= r − r(t), the simplest prejudiced learning rule is
linear in either of these variables:
∆(t+ 1) = α · r(t) ·∆(t),
with a parameter α > 0. Re-expressed in the original variables it reads
r(t + 1) = r − α · r(t) · (r − r(t)) or
w(t+ 1) = (1 − α) · w + α · w(t) · (1− w(t) + w).
This rule reflects the cautiousness inherent in the axioms, in tending to main-
tain a prejudice of high risk (low weight). It satisfies conditions b) and c) and
can be augmented by a simple condition on α to also satisfy a), see Section 3.4
below. Two extremal cases for the parameter α are α = 0, in which case the
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agent immediately learns the input value r, i.e., no prejudice is present, and
α = 1/r(0) prohibiting any learning.
Introducing the relative error δ(t) ≡ ∆(t)/r the learning map reduces to
δ(t+ 1) = α ·
∆(t)
r
(
r −∆(t)
)
= αr ·
∆(t)
r
(
1−
∆(t)
r
)
=
= fρ(δ(t)) ≡ ρ · δ(t)(1 − δ(t)), with ρ ≡ αr.
This is the well known logistic map [24, Section 7–4], whose characteristics are
entirely determined by the bifurcation parameter ρ. It is usually considered as
a self-mapping of the unit interval, but note that the natural domain for δ is
here [(r − 1)/r, 1].
3.3. Classes of Behaviour. We assume the intrinsic parameters (α, r(0)) to
be invariable characteristics of a given agent. Then, in the noiseless case, the
behaviour of an agent is determined by these intrinsic parameters, and the
environmental parameter r via ρ = αr. We tentatively distinguish between
three classes of agents, and denote them heuristically as follows.
Adaptive (A): For ρ < 1, the logistic map has 0 as a single, attractive fixed
point. These agents are therefore bound to adapt to the external input r at an
exponential rate.
Stubborn (S): In the domain 1 < ρ < 3, the fixed point 0 becomes unstable,
and the unique stable fixed point is δ∗ = (ρ − 1)/ρ, which is again approached
at an exponential rate. Agents of this class are bound to persistently underes-
timate the true risk to a certain degree.
Uncertain (U): For 4 > ρ > 3, the logistic map exhibits a bifurcating tran-
sition to deterministic chaos. Those agents exhibit an increasingly erratic be-
haviour as ρ rises, which we subsume under the label ‘uncertainty’.
For ρ > 4, the logistic map is no longer a self-mapping of the unit interval.
We simply ignore this case.
We will see in Section 3.4 that behaviours of the last two classes S and U
can, under reasonable assumptions, only occur if the agent initially underes-
timates the risk r(0) < r. On the other hand, an initial value r(0) > r will
lead to agents of class A, corroborating the heuristics that cautiousness, that
is overestimation of the risk, entails a rather safe behaviour.
3.4. Viability Conditions. In many senses, the logistic learning map is too
simple to work properly. In particular, it does not satisfy axiom a), but this
can be accomplished by adapting the intrinsic parameters (α, r(0)). The value
r(0) = 1 implies α = 1. This condition, which we impose from now on, is a
paradigm for what we call a viability condition. These are conditions on
the intrinsic parameters that guarantee a proper functioning of the agents or
improve their performance in a given environment. A biological heuristics for
their prevalence is that agents not fulfilling them are naturally deselected.
We use two other viability conditions. First, we restrict the range of admis-
sible α-values for all agent classes to α < 1/r(0), to make the learning map
contractive at least in the first time step, and to omit the extremal case of non-
learning α = 1/r(0) mentioned above. Though we could restrict the range of
α further to avoid the occurrence of agents with ρ > 4, we refrain from posing
the pertinent intrinsic condition α ≤ 4, since this demand seems too restrictive
for all classes. As said above, we ignore agents with resulting ρ > 4.
The last condition concerns only agents of class A and is somewhat more
severe in its consequences: For these agents, the fixed point δ∗ is negative and
moreover repulsive. If it lies within the range [1−1/r, 1] of admissible δ-values,
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then the learning map would diverge to δ → −∞ whenever r(t) becomes < δ∗.
Although this could be avoided in the noiseless case by admitting only start
values r(0) ≥ δ∗, it would almost surely happen in noisy environments, e.g.,
the additive noise model of the following subsection. To prevent this disastrous
effect we require α < 1 for A-agents as the third viability condition. This leads
to δ∗ < 1− 1/r, pushing the repulsive fixed point out of the range of δ.
The viability conditions already have direct consequences for S- and I-agents.
Due to the condition α < 1/r(0), the case ρ > 1 can only occur if r/r(0) > ρ > 1,
i.e., if the agent initially underestimates the risk. Furthermore, The higher
values of ρ, and therefore the more complex behaviour patterns, emerge with
increasing discrepancy between initial belief r(0) and knowledge η(t) = r. We
have given a heuristic interpretation of these features in Section 3.3.
Although it would be desirable to dispense with the viability conditions by
refining the learning rule, this does not seem easy at the given level of sim-
plicity, without giving away other desired features. For instance, consider the
straightforward attempt to adapt the parameter α with time to keep it < r(t),
e.g., using the additional rule α(t + 1) = α(t)r(t)/r(t + 1), and thus force the
learning map to be contractive at all times. This would certainly enable us to
lift the viability condition α < 1 for A-agents. Yet, apart from necessitating at
least a one-step memory for the prejudiced learner, it would also let the mod-
ified agents become subject to fluctuations in r(t), something the heuristics
for the construction of prejudiced learning rules suggests to avoid in the first
place. We will propose a measure of the pertinent quality in Section 4, and see
that the logistic learning map amended by the viability conditions performs
well with respect to it.
As opposed to these linear boundary conditions in parameter space, we will
employ boundary conditions in real space in the next subsection, when submit-
ting the system to a noisy environment.
We can now obtain a very coarse picture on the relative proportions in which
an observer would expect the three behavioural classes to occur in a population
of prejudiced learners. We calculate the a priori probabilities for an agent to
belong to one of the classes, assuming that (r, r(0), ρ) are uniformly distributed
in the domain (0, 1)2 × {0 ≤ ρ < r/r(0)}, ignoring the last viability condition
that affects only A-agents. Integrating over the pertinent ranges and discard-
ing agents with a resulting ρ > 4 yields the ratios 4/5, 8/45, and 1/45 for class
A, S, and I, respectively. Thus, this naïve estimation renders adaptive be-
haviour prevalent, while stubborn and uncertain behaviour occur with small
but non-negligible probability.
3.5. Adding Noise. We now assume that the input η(t) of the prejudiced
learning rule underlies additive, statistical fluctuations around the true risk
value r, i.e.,
η(t) = r + Ξ(t),
with a random variable Ξ. As the simplest possible noise model we choose Ξ to
be symmetrically distributed with spread Σ ≥ 0 around 0. That is, Ξ is i.i.d. in
[−Σ,Σ]. To keep η in [0, 1], this limits the range of admissible values for Σ to
0 ≤ Σ ≤ min(r, 1 − r). Using relative coordinates δ(t) and ξ(t) ≡ Ξ(t) · ρ/r, we
can separate the fluctuations from the learning map:
δ(t+ 1) = fρ,ξ(δ(t)) = fρ(δ(t)) +
ξ(t)
ρ
· (ρ(1− δ(t)) − 1)
= fρ(δ(t)) + ξ(t)(δ(t) − δ
∗).
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∆
∆
∆
FIGURE 2. Average error of A-agents. Numbers at top/bottom
curves denote minimum/maximum values of Σ, between which
the remaining curves interpolate in equidistant steps.
This is an example of a random dynamical system (RDS). In this special case, it
is a dynamical system with inhomogeneous noise, for which the inhomogeneity
δ(t) − δ∗ vanishes at the fix point. While systems with homogeneous, additive
noise have been intensively studied, the inhomogeneous case is scarce in the
literature. The additive separation of the noise from the dynamical mapping
means, in particular, that we will still be able to make use of the tentative
classification of Section 3.3 for the noiseless case, to classify, at least partially,
the behaviour of the agents under noise.
The change of variable from Ξ to ξ renders ξ an i.i.d. random variable with
range [−σ/2, σ/2], where σ = 2ρ/r · Σ. Therefore, the general bounds α <
1/r(0) and Σ ≤ min(r, 1 − r) imply σ < 2/r(0) · min(r, 1 − r) in general, and
σ < 2ρ in dependence of ρ. On the other hand, the noise level σ is limited to
σ < 2min(r, 1− r) for A-agents by the viability condition α < 1.
Since the noise is in general non-vanishing at both boundaries of the do-
main [(r − 1)/r, 1] of δ, the functions fρ,ξ are in general not self-mappings of
this domain, and thus need to be augmented by boundary conditions. For the
performance analysis of A-agents in the next section we use boundary condi-
tions of von Neumann type
fρ,ξ((r − 1)/r) = (r − 1)/r, fρ,ξ(1) = 1,
for all ρ < 1, ξ. That means that when the system hits the boundary, it remains
there for one step and has, due to noise, a probability ≥ 1/2 to leave it in the
next step.
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FIGURE 3. Average volatility of A-agents.
4. PERFORMANCE UNDER NOISE
Our prime heuristic for the introduction of the limitation of rationality pre-
sented by prejudice into learning was that agents can benefit from not fol-
lowing stochastic fluctuations, in addition to minimising the errors they make.
Therefore, the performance of prejudiced agents in a noisy environment should
be assessed by considering at least the following two natural quantities. The
first one is simply the average error∆ which is a measure for the deterioration
of learning performance due to prejudice. However, we expect the learners to
benefit from prejudice by capitalising on a reduction of the average volatility
v
def
= |r(t + 1)− r(t)| of their belief, a variable which might for example be asso-
ciated with an energy cost, perhaps arising from an energetic price the agents
would have to pay for changing their selected action. We use these two vari-
ables to analyse the performance of adaptive agents by numerical simulations.
The benign neglect of S- and I-agents is motivated by their fundamentally
different behaviour that hampers a quantitative comparison with A-agents. In
particular, stubborn agents have a constant error ∆ > 0 and volatility 0. This
persists even when they are subjected to noise, as will be seen, together with
further qualitative features of the other agent classes, in Section 5.
As a further restriction, following the heuristics that statistical learning is
slow in comparison to the frequency of prejudiced learning and decision mak-
ing, we consider the limiting case in which the fluctuation level Σ is constant,
and thus ignore statistical learning altogether. Generically, we would suppose
it to exhibit a slow decay, depending on the efficiency of the statistical learning
rule and the characteristics of the environment.
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Simulations took place in the parameter ranges 0 < r < 1, 0 < α < 1,
restricted by the viability conditions of Section 3.4, and 0 < Σ < min(r, 1 −
r), determined by the noise model of Section 3.5. The results for error and
volatility are shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively, in which every data point
represents an average over 2.5 × 106 time steps in 25 independent runs with
random starting values r(0).
It springs to the eye in Figure 2 that the error induced by noise is always
negative, i.e., leads the agents to overestimate the risk. Furthermore, the er-
ror is always small, hardly ever reaching 10 percent, and tends to be somewhat
smaller above r = 0.5 than below. Thus, the heuristics on cautiousness inher-
ent in the construction of the model is confirmed in this experimental setting.
On the other hand, as the last two rows in Figure 3 show, a stabilising
mechanism of prejudiced learning becomes effective with increasing α, as v
decreases from its unadulterated value 2/3Σ at α = 0. This is particularly true
for higher r entailing a higher dynamical parameter ρ. In fact, as the graph for
r = 0.9 exhibits, the learners become completely stable when ρ approaches 1,
even in the presence of noise. This remarkable feature will be studied further
in Section 5.
Altogether, prejudice in learning has the potential to improve the perfor-
mance of agents by reducing their volatility significantly, while not putting
them far out in their risk estimation, or impeding the efficacy of learning too
much. In particular, the learning rate, or rather the rate at which a stable
equilibrium is approached, remains exponential.
5. A NOISY DYNAMICAL SYSTEM
5.1. Noise Induced Stability of Prejudiced Learning. In Section 4 we
have seen that the prejudiced learning map becomes increasingly stable as
ρ approaches 1, despite the presence of noise. In fact, the inhomogeneity of the
noise, vanishing at the fixed point ρ∗, leads us to the suspicion that this point
plays a special role for the dynamics of the map at higher ρ. In this section
we want to pursue this trail further, and consider the features of the map for
ρ between 1 and 4, the upper limit at which the noiseless logistic map reaches
full deterministic chaos.
Here and in the subsequent numerical analysis we employ periodic bound-
ary conditions, i.e., we consider the random RDS fρ,σ defined by
xt+1 = fρ,ξt(xt)
def
= ρxt(1 − xt) + ξt(xt − x
∗) mod 1,
with ξ an i.i.d. random variable in [−σ/2, σ/2], and x∗ = (ρ − 1)/ρ. These
boundary conditions make the presentation and the numerics somewhat sim-
pler, while it turns out that they do not affect the behaviour of the system
significantly.
Simulations of this system show that, for many combinations of the dynam-
ical parameter ρ and a nonzero noise level σ, it rapidly approaches, and then
stably remains at, the fixed point x∗. In fact, this holds for all admissible noise
levels σ < 2ρ in the domain 1 < ρ < 3 corresponding to agents of class S. Yet
the effect prevails even for a continuum of agents of class U, that is, in the
parameter range 3 < ρ < 4, where the noiseless system undergoes Hopf bi-
furcations into 2n cycles on the route to deterministic chaos. An example for
this stochastic resonance is shown in Figure 4b), while Figures 4c) and d) show
how bifurcating behaviour is restored through a stochastic bifurcation, when
the noise level is lowered to leave the domain of the resonance (the stability
domain). These two phenomena are examined in the following subsections.
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a) σ = 4.8 b) σ = 1.37
c) σ = 1.1 d) σ = 0.7
FIGURE 4. Examples for evolutions at ρ = 3.08.
5.2. Basics of Noisy Dynamics. Let us first introduce the necessary prereq-
uisites on noisy, respectively, random dynamical systems. We rely on [25] as a
primary source, and develop the material using the logistic learningmap above
as an example. Note that more refined theoretical tools for the treatment of
such systems abound by now, see for instance [26], but are not needed in the
analysis of the simple system at hand.
Every RDS, including the present, is completely characterised by its transi-
tion density Pρ,σ(x, y), which yields the probability under fρ,σ for ending up
in an interval J ⊂ [0, 1] upon starting in I ⊂ [0, 1], by the formula
Prρ,σ(I → J) =
∫
I
∫
J
Pρ,σ(x, y)dydx.
Figure 5 shows an example of this density. Explicitly we find
Pρ,σ(x, y) = (σ|x− x
∗|)−1 · χ[x−σ
2
|x−x∗|,x+σ
2
|x−x∗|](y),
where χ is the characteristic function of an interval, and periodic boundary
conditions are implicitly assumed on all variables. The transition density
serves to define the Perron–Frobenius (P–F) operator of an RDS, a central
tool in the system’s analysis [7]. This operator acts on functions u ∈ L1([0, 1]),
i.e., probability densities by
PF(u)(y)
def
=
∫ 1
0
Pρ,σ(fρ(x), y)u(x)dx.
The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of PF are of key importance. In particu-
lar, the positive and normalised eigenvectors to the highest eigenvalue 1, i.e.,
probability densities u with PF(u) = u, are called invariant densities of the
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FIGURE 5. P3.08,1.2 (left) and associated noise alone (right).
system. An invariant density u defines an associated invariant measure µu
by µu(A)
def
=
∫
A
u(x)dx, where A is any Lebesgue-measurable set. An important
example of an invariant measure for the present system is µδx∗ generated by
the the point measure δx∗ at x
∗, as an easy calculation shows, using the fact
that Pρ,σ(xn, ·) is a δx∗ -sequence if xn → x
∗.
Yet more interest lies in the so-called physically significant or Bowen–
Ruelle–Sinai (BRS) measures. A BRS-measure µBRS is defined for an ordi-
nary, i.e., non-random dynamical system, defined by a deterministic mapping
f , by the following property. There exists a subset U of the configuration space
considered and with positive Lebesgue measure, such that for every continu-
ous function ψ, the following holds
lim
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
Ψ(f j(x)) =
∫
ΨdµBRS,
for all starting points x ∈ U , where f j denotes the jth iterate of f , see [27].
By the Birkhoff individual ergodic theorem, this property is always fulfilled
for µBRS-almost all x. The crucial strengthening of the hypothesis lies in the
assumption that the ergodic hypothesis can be safely applied for all starting
points x in a set of positive Lebesgue measure. For a RDS, the above property
must be formulated in the mean with respect to the stochastic perturbation,
i.e., the noise. Since most physically interesting quantities of a dynamical sys-
tem are time averages, an ergodic hypothesis is regularly invoked by physicists
to calculate them by space averages. This makes the existence and uniqueness
of BRS-measures an important theoretical issue in the study of random and
ordinary dynamical systems.
5.3. Stable Phase and Lyapunov Exponent. We are now in a position to
bolster the heuristic conjecture of noise induced stability in the parameter
range 3 < ρ < 4 with theoretical and numerical evidence. Furthermore, we
want to determine the shape of the latter stable phase, i.e., the set of (ρ, σ)
values for which the point mass concentrated at x∗ generates the unique BRS-
measure, that is µBRS = µδx∗ .
The Lyapunov exponent λ is central to the study of dynamical systems.
It is the measure for the exponential rate at which distant starting points con-
verge to an attractor under the system’s evolution, respectively, the rate at
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FIGURE 6. Stable Lyapunov exponent λS.
which nearby starting points become separated. In the former case, λ is nega-
tive, and in the latter positive, while zeros of λmark transitions in the system’s
behaviour. Lyapunov exponents can be used to detect stability, bifurcations,
and the onset of chaos, and one of the simplest examples for their use is, again,
the logistic map [24, Section 7-4]. It has been questioned whether Lyapunov
exponents play the same role for RDS, since there are examples in which a
positive λ does not indicate ordinary chaotic behaviour [28, 29]. Yet, a negative
Lyapunov exponent always corresponds to stability, and therefore we chose to
tentatively characterise the stable phase of our system through the property
λ < 0. The quantity itself is defined by the time average
λ
def
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
t=0
ln |f ′ρ,ξt(xt)|.
If a BRS-measure is known, λ can be calculated, using an ergodic theorem, as
a space average
λ =
〈∫ 1
0
ln |f ′ρ,ξ(x)|dµBRS(x)
〉
ξ
,
taking into account that in the noisy case we also have to average over the
random variable ξ.
The stable Lyapunov exponent λS is now calculated under the assump-
tion µBRS = µδx∗ . For the given noise model we obtain
λS(ρ, σ) =
1
σ
∫ σ/2
−σ/2
∫ 1
0
ln |f ′ρ,ξ(x)|dµBRS(x)dξ
=
1
σ
∫ σ/2
−σ/2
ln |f ′ρ,ξ(x
∗)|dξ
=
1
σ
∫ σ/2
−σ/2
ln |ρ(1− 2x∗) + ξ|dξ
=
1
σ
∫ σ/2
−σ/2
ln(ρ− 2 + ξ)dξ,
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FIGURE 7. Numerical evaluation of λ(ρ, σ). On a regular grid
with resolution (0.0025, 0.05), each point represents 25 indepen-
dent runs of length 106,after omitting 104 initial iterations
for ρ− 2 > σ/2, and by a change of variable ζ = ρ− 2 + ξ we finally find, using
the abbreviations ∆± = ρ− 2± σ/2
λS =
∫ ln∆+
ln∆−
ζeζ
σ
dζ =
[
ζ − 1
σ
eζ
]ln∆+
ln∆−
.
Similar calculations in the two other cases ρ − 2 < σ/2 and ρ − 2 = σ/2 yield
the net result
λS(ρ, σ) =
1
σ


(ln∆+ − 1) ln∆+ − (ln∆− − 1) ln∆−, if ∆− > 0;
(lnσ − 1) lnσ, if ∆− = 0;
(ln∆+ − 1) ln∆+ + (ln |∆−| − 1) ln |∆−|, if ∆− < 0.
(∗)
Figure 6 displays this result. The solid curve in both pictures is the nodeline
λS = 0 at which the hypothesis µBRS = µδx∗ breaks down, while the dotted line
in the right picture is ρ− 2 = σ/2, where the two solutions in (∗) connect. The
conjectured stability domain is marked by S.
We confirm the existence of a stable phase empirically by collecting numeri-
cal data for the Lyapunov exponent using time averages, obtaining the picture
shown in Figure 7. We find that λ is identical to λS within the statistical error
bounds for the most part of the region S. Yet for higher σ & 3, the empiri-
cal values of λ are significantly larger than λS along the inner boundary of S.
It seems plausible that the strongly intermittent behaviour of the system in
that region, of which Figure 4a) shows an example, together with the periodic
boundary conditions, in effect, prevents the convergence of λ to λS .
5.4. Stochastic Bifurcation. The sample evolutions in Figure 4b)–d) exhibit
the stochastic bifurcation the system undergoeswhen the noise level is lowered
to leave the stable phase. We now examine this noise induced transition closer
at ρ = 3.08. It occurs at the transition point σ0(ρ), which is obtained by numer-
ically solving for the lower solution of λS(ρ, σ0(ρ)) = 0 in equation (∗), yielding
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FIGURE 8. Invariant densities at ρ = 3.08 on a regular
partition of {σ ∈ [0, 1.4]} × {x ∈ [0.4, 0.9]} with resolution
(0.025, 0.0025), for N = 1000, and M = 4 × 106. Cells with
absolute probabilities below 10−3 appear white.
σ0(3.08) ≈ 1.3683. As σ approaches 0, the system converges to the deterministic
2-cycle with attractor
{
ρ± =
1
2ρ(ρ+ 1±
√
(ρ+ 1)(ρ− 3))
}
.
Figure 8 shows the development of the invariant densities for the BRS mea-
sures at ρ = 3.08 as σ varies. The data for a given σ represents the distribution
ofM i.i.d. starting points after evolving N time steps. This statistical strategy
can be justified if we assume that the Perron–Frobenius–Ruelle theorem [25]
holds. It asserts, among others, that the iterates PF
N (u) of any density u of
a normalised measure which is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the BRS measure,
converge to the density of the BRS measure as N → ∞. However, just above
the transition point (marked by the solid vertical line) the BRS measure µδx∗ is
not well approximated with N = 1000, cf. Figure 4b). Below σ0, the singularity
of the invariant density disappears, and it develops two maxima around σ ≈ 1,
which become separated at σ ≈ 0.75. Overall, the transition is a rather typical
example for a stochastic bifurcation [8, Chapter 9].
Recently, it has been conjectured that stochastic bifurcations are in close
correspondence to phase transitions in systems of statistical mechanics [30].
Although the theoretical basis for such a claim is presently not firm, the two
classes of phenomena exhibit many common features. One of them is symmetry
breaking, which is also present in the stochastic bifurcations of our system. It
can be exhibited by looking at the evolution of the return map during the
bifurcation. This map is defined by the sequence of the local expansion rates
yt
def
= ln
∣∣f ′ρ,ξt(xt)∣∣,
and the statistical distribution of pairs (yt, yt+1) is its transition density, for
which some examples are shown in Figure 9. The symmetry with respect to
reflections on the diagonal that is present in the stable phase, is broken by the
stochastic bifurcation.
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σ = 1.5 σ = 1.36 σ = 1.227
σ = 1.09 σ = 0.954 σ = 0.81
σ = 0.681 σ = 0.545 σ = 0.409
σ = 0.27 σ = 0.136 σ = 0
FIGURE 9. Transition densities of the return map at ρ = 3.08,
approximated on a regular 200× 200 partition of [−2, 2]2 using
10 × 106 iterations, omitting 104 initial steps. Cells with abso-
lute probabilities below 10−6 appear white.
5.5. Critical Exponent. Finally, we want to further stress the analogy be-
tween stochastic bifurcations and critical phenomena in statistical mechan-
ics [31]. A characteristic of the latter is the vanishing or divergence of certain
intensive observable quantities, called order parameters, at the critical point.
Their values near the critical point are governed by universal scaling laws,
which are quantitatively described by the so called critical exponents.
As a very simple example demonstrating the general scheme, consider the
first bifurcation of the noiseless logistic map at ρc = 3. The only relevant
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FIGURE 10. Left: Recurrence time statistics at τ = 0; N =
5× 103, m = 5 × 104 (+); N = 105, m = 5 × 104 (◦); N = 5× 106,
m = 103 (). Right: Correction for N = 105, m = 5 × 104;
τ ≈ 0.00291 (); τ = 0 (◦); TP (+) and linear fit.
order parameter is the Lyapunov exponent, which vanishes at ρc with a critical
exponent
γ±
def
= lim
τ→0±
lnλ(τ)
ln |τ |
= 1,
determined as the exponent of the leading power in the expansion of λ in the
scale-free parameter τ
def
= (ρ− ρc)/ρc.
In our RDS, there are a number of other order parameters apart from λ that
can be considered, and we use the Poincaré dimension of the critical point x∗,
which is a very natural measure for the collapse of the invariant density to
δx∗ at the critical point. It is determined by the recurrence time statistics as
follows, cf. [32]. The Pioncarè recurrence time, which is the average time
after which the system returns to a small domain Br(x
∗)
def
= {x | |x− x∗| ≤ r} of
radius r around x∗, is given by
TP(r)
def
= lim
N→∞
N
#{xi ∈ Br(x∗), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}
.
Obviously, this is not a scale-free quantity, so to obtain the desired order pa-
rameter, one assumes that TP behaves asymptotically as
TP(r) ∝ r
−DP (r → 0).
The number DP so defined is the Poincaré dimension of x
∗. As the system
enters the stable phase, with scale-free parameter τ
def
=(σ0(ρ)−σ)/σ0(ρ) tending
to 0 from above, TP(r) approaches 1 for all r, and we expect DP to vanish.
In the following, we examine the transition at ρ = 3.08. Figure 10 shows
various examples for recurrence time statistics gathered by numerical simula-
tions with m independent runs of length N , always omitting 104 initial steps.
In the left picture we see three graphs for TP at the critical point τ = 0 for
various N . This exhibits the problem that, due to the combined effects of slow
convergence of the system as such, and the additional numerical error which
becomes relevant near the critical point, the measured Poincaré dimension
does not seem to converge to zero as N −→ ∞ (and does not depend on the
sample size for m > 104). To circumvent this difficulty we tentatively replace
TP at given τ and N with ‘corrected’ values TP gained by division by TP at τ = 0
and the same sampling time N , as shown in the right picture. A comparison
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FIGURE 11. Poincaré-dimensions and log-periodic fit at ρ = 3.08.
of the ‘corrected’ Poincaré dimensions DP obtained from the TP for different
values of N , see Figure 11, shows that these quantities do not depend strongly
on N , lending some justification to this approach.
Remarkably it turns out that the behaviour of DP near τ = 0 is not gov-
erned by a simple power law. Recently it has been observed in a number of
areas that singularities in many natural phenomena exhibit log-periodic os-
cillations corresponding to complex critical exponents, see [33, Section 3] and
references therein. In such cases, one generally expects the considered observ-
able to behave asymptotically like Re τβ+iω = τβ cos(ω ln τ). Therefore, we fit
the Ansatz
DP(τ) ∝ A+Bτ
β + Cτβ cos(ω ln τ + φ) (τ → 0).
to the dataset for DP. This yields the continuous line in Figure 11 as the best
fit graph, and the corresponding value of the critical exponent is
β = 1.18± 0.05.
Notice that the modification of the pure power law is rather small, as is ex-
pressed by the ratio B/C ≈ 3.3/0.25 = 13.2. Similar analysis for ρ = 3.12
confirms that β is within the given error bounds.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Reiterating that general conclusions about prejudiced learning rules cannot,
properly speaking, be derived by considering a single instance as we did above,
we still want to note some of the indications which the detailed study of this
special case provides us with.
The model for prejudiced learning and behaviour presented above is rather
plain by its construction, which was focused on a few fundamental aspects we
deemed characteristic. Its utter simplicity, although of conceptual beauty, ap-
pears as a drawback when its performance is critically assessed. For instance,
it made the introduction of viability conditions necessary to ensure the desired
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functionality of the model, see Section 3.4. These conditions are unsavoury
in rendering the three different classes of prejudiced learners incomparable.
Yet, they are at least intrinsic conditions that can be satisfied by excluding cer-
tain values of the model’s parameters from consideration. Totalling, the model
itself calls for refinement to be applicable, and performant, in more realistic
situations. Nevertheless, the basic performance results gathered in Section 4
support the heuristics of model building inasmuch as the class of adaptive
agents learns at exponential speed, and can benefit from prejudice in a noisy
environment by reducing their volatility significantly.
The most important phenomenological aspect of our model is doubtlessly
the possible emergence of stubbornness as a secondary phenomenon of preju-
dice. In fact, for ρ > 1, it becomes the prevalent behaviour in noisy environ-
ments, aided by the mechanism of noise induced stability, a mechanism which
is rather generic for nonlinear systems driven by noise and thus could well
apply for other prejudiced learning rules than the logistic one. It must be em-
phasised that stubbornness cannot be ruled out as not being performant and
therefore rare in realistic ensembles of prejudiced learners. The only condi-
tion for stubbornness to appear likely in individual agents is that the risk is
initially underestimated (by the pertinent viability condition) and high, since
ρ = αr. Stubbornness thus is a high risk phenomenon. One scenario particu-
larly catches the imagination. Assume for the moment that we have removed
the awkward viability condition α < 1 for adaptive agents, e.g., by replacing it
with suitable boundary conditions. Then, agents of class A can be pushed into
classes S or U by a sudden rise of risk, and consequently become stubborn.
The expectation to find the logistic prejudiced learning rule as such realised
in learning systems and environments as complex as human beings and hu-
man societies is doubtful. Yet it might still be a candidate model for the de-
scription of certain behavioural aspects of biological systems from the level of
single-cells to that of plants and lower animals. The thorough adherence to the
principle of simplicity in the construction of the model, realised in the rather
reduced game-theoretic framework, the minimal set of axioms, and finally the
learning rule itself, in particular its memorylessness, are in favour of that view.
Furthermore, the rich phenomenology of the model can aid its identification in
such systems through the provision of many indicators — stubbornness being
a prime one, alongside the characteristic adaptive behaviour with attenuated
volatility.
Let us conclude by indicating some directions for further research, and pos-
ing some open questions.
In this first study, we have only considered static environments. One step
to a more realistic model would be to include the effect of a statistical learning
rule in it. This would generally lead to a slowly decreasing noise level, and
in turn could let agents undergo behavioural changes. For example in class
U, lowering the noise leads to cyclic behaviour (‘evasive’) through stochastic
bifurcations.
It would further be interesting, along the lines sketched above, to improve
the prejudiced learning rule itself by adding dynamical features. Within the
framework of our model, making the prejudice parameter α dynamic naturally
stands to reason, although too simplistic approaches would be inappropriate,
cf. Section 3.4. In view of the heuristics for the performance of prejudiced
learners developed in Section 4 it would seem promising, for example, to lower
α when the agent has lived through a period of low volatility in the recent
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past. This modification would in particular pertain to S-agents, whose be-
haviour would then eventually become adaptive after some time in most cases,
unlike S-agents with fixed α, and ρ > 3, which normally enter the uncertain
(bifurcating) mode when the noise level decreases.
While we have concentrated here on the behaviour and performance of an
individual prejudiced learner, studying the effects their presence will have at
the community level in a society of learning agents is an important playground
for further research. Good objects for such a study would be small-world net-
works [34, 35, 36, 37] as models for propagation of information. A prime ques-
tion here is to what extent a proportion of prejudiced learners can stabilise
beliefs in the given society. Studying these issues is work in progress.
This also, and finally, leads us to formulate some questions of an evolution-
ary kind. What quantitative relations between agents having various intrinsic
parameters, i.e., belonging to different classes, would emanate through evolu-
tionary pressure, over many generations of learners? The viability conditions
of Section 3.4 reflect our presumptions on the net effect of evolutionary selec-
tion on the distribution of (α, r(0)), and for A-agents we have seen in Section 4
that they have, in principle, a good chance to compete. Yet both the former
presumptions and the latter claim still have to stand the test of more realistic
models, including concrete performance measures and evolutionary selection
schemes.
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